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Federalism in Brazil
Keith S. Rosenn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike in Canada and the United States, where federalism was
a technique for uniting states and provinces that had once been
autonomous political entities, in Brazil federalism was a technique
for dividing what had always been a unitary system of govern-
ment.' Unlike her neighboring colonies of Latin America, Brazil
followed a unique path that led to independence without war, and
to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that lasted for
67 years. 2
Under the Empire, Brazil had a unitary system of government,
divided into twenty provinces. The provinces served as election
districts for a National Congress with a Senate and a Chamber of
Deputies. The provinces elected deputies for four-year terms. The
Emperor, however, selected the Senators, who would serve life
terms, from a list of three names submitted by each province. Un-
fortunately, the election process was so manipulated by the cen-
tral government that the Congress did little to represent the in-
terests of the very limited electorate.
The Brazilian provinces were further subdivided into munici-
palities, 3 with each province and municipality electing its own
council. But these councils had no legislative, taxing, or adminis-
* The author is a Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law, Coral
Gables, Florida. This paper was prepared for the "Federalism in the Americas... and Be-
yond" symposium held at Duquesne University School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
November 12 and 13, 2004.
1. In practice, however, the enormity of Brazil's land mass and the weakness of the
Portuguese colonial regime meant that large parts of Brazil, especially in the interior, were
ruled de facto by large landowners. Moreover, the Portuguese Crown began its reign in
Brazil by creating a series of hereditary captaincies in which the King ceded vast powers to
a small group of large landowners.
2. In the beginning of the 19th century, in response to Napoleon's invasion of the
Iberian peninsula, the Portuguese monarchy relocated to Rio de Janeiro. In 1815, the
Crown proclaimed the Joint Kingdom of Brazil and Portugal. Not until 1820 did the Portu-
guese finally persuade the reluctant King Jodo to return to Portugal, but he left behind his
son, Pedro, as regent. In 1822, Pedro declared Brazilian independence, and Portugal peace-
fully acquiesced.
3. The Portuguese term municipio is usually translated as municipality, but its ad-
ministrative characteristics are actually closer to a county. This is because the municipio is
not simply a city, but also includes the rural territory surrounding an urban area.
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trative powers. Any resolution they proposed had to be submitted
to the National Congress for enactment into law. Real authority
to govern each province rested in a president, who was appointed
and removed by the Emperor. 4 Despite considerable unhappiness
from the wealthier southeastern and southern provinces, who fa-
vored decentralization, devolution of tax revenues, and diminution
in their subsidies to the economically backward Northeast, the
Empire managed to hold the vast subcontinent of Brazil together
until its forcible overthrow.
In 1889, the military, with the encouragement of certain civilian
groups, staged a coup di'tat and declared Brazil a federal republic.
The 1891 Constitution, which was modeled upon that of the
United States, institutionalized Brazilian federalism. Brazil did
not adopt federalism for the traditional reasons of uniting polities
that had previously been sovereign entities, nor as a device to gov-
ern different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. Indeed, there
was no serious bargaining among the members of the federation
about its future characteristics; the virtually powerless former
provinces were simply converted into quasi-sovereign states, first
by military fiat and later by the 1891 Constitution.
The Brazilians adopted federalism as a reaction against the
Empire's authoritarian, heavily centralized rule in a country with
enormous size and distinct regions with quite different traditions.
Brazil has a land mass of roughly 8.5 million square kilometers,
making it the fifth largest country in the world. Because federal-
ism grants regional units significant political and economic auton-
omy, it is a useful system for governing large land masses with
diverse regions and populations. Federalism has allowed Brazil to
maintain national unity while creating a substantial measure of
local autonomy to accommodate economically diverse regions. If
only because of its immense size, federalism is a sensible form of
government for Brazil.
Federalism is presently far stronger in Brazil than in any other
Latin American country.5 Yet Brazilian federalism, like that of
the other Latin American federalist nations, is far more central-
ized than it is in Canada or in the United States. British coloniza-
tion synthesized Protestantism, Locke's social compact theory, and
4. HERMAN G. JAMES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL 5 (1923).
5. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 43 (1994).
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the natural rights of Englishmen.6 This North American inheri-
tance of theology and political theory was far more conducive to
the structured dispersal of power among many regional centers
than Brazil's inheritance of the centralized, hierarchical organiza-
tion of Roman Catholicism coupled with the absolutism of the Por-
tuguese monarchy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERALISM IN BRAZIL
Since 1891, Brazil has oscillated between centralized and decen-
tralized political governance. Brazilian federalism has gone
through the following five distinct phases: (1) the Old Republic
(1889-1930); (2) the authoritarian rule of Getfilio Vargas; (3) the
Democratic Restoration period (1945-1964); (4) the Military Re-
gimes (1964-1985); and (5) the New Republic (1985 to the present).
A. The Old Republic (1889-1930)
The era known as the Old Republic began by the conversion of
twenty former provinces into quasi-sovereign states. Each state
and the federal district elected three Senators to the National
Congress. Representation in the National Chamber of Deputies
was apportioned among the states in accordance with population,
but each state had at least four deputies. States were given vast
powers to govern themselves and to impose taxes, but the princi-
pal revenue sources allocated to the states were taxes on imports
and exports, measures antithetical to the creation of a common
market. States were also given the power to raise their own ar-
mies and to borrow money abroad. The federal government was
relatively weak, and the country was dominated by the governors
of two powerful states, Sdo Paulo and Minas Gerais. Elections
were marred by widespread manipulation and fraud, and the fed-
eral government not infrequently intervened in the operation of
the weaker states. Because federalism functioned so poorly, Bra-
zil adopted a constitutional amendment in 1926 that substantially
6. For the importance of the Protestant, particularly Calvinist, theological underpin-
nings for the development of federal democracy in the U.S. colonies, see Daniel J. Elazar &
Ilan Greilsammer, Federal Democracy: The U.S.A. and Europe Compared A Political Sci-
ence Perspective, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
EXPERIENCE 71, 77-79 (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds. 1986).
See also Bernard J.S. HoetjeV, The European Tradition of Federalism: The Protestant Di-
mension, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION: COMPETING TRADITIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 117 (Michael Burgess & Alain G. Gagnon eds. 1993).
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expanded the power of the federal government to intervene in the
states and reduced state autonomy.
B. The Vargas Era (1930-1945)
In 1930, Getdlio Vargas, governor of the State of Rio Grande do
Sul and a defeated presidential candidate in the elections held
that year, came to power because of an armed rebellion of disaf-
fected military officers, the tenentes (lieutenants), and members of
the political elite. The rebellion was triggered by the failure to
honor the bargain to rotate the presidency between the governors
of Sdo Paulo and Minas Gerais, and the assassination of the oppo-
sition's vice-presidential candidate. Vargas presided over the re-
gion during an era in which federalism was gradually reduced to
an empty shell. The Vargas era was characterized by strong cen-
tralization of power in the hands of the federal government. In
1937, Vargas created the Estado Novo, a dictatorship in which the
states lost their independent bases of taxation and were converted
essentially into administrative divisions of a unitary state.7 Var-
gas publicly burned the state flags, closed Congress and the state
legislatures, and replaced the state governors with intervenors.
8
C. The Restoration of Democracy (1945-1964)
In 1945, another military revolt overthrew the Vargas dictator-
ship and reestablished a federal democracy. The 1946 Constitu-
tion granted significantly more autonomy for state and local gov-
ernments. Federal intervention into the states, which had been
common prior to this period, became a rarity. Governors were
popularly elected, and states were given their own powers, espe-
cially the power to tax, although they were forced to share tax
revenues with the municipalities. Certain measures were intro-
duced to transfer revenues from the richer states to the poorer
states, particularly those in the Northeast and Amazon regions.
7. JOSEPH LOVE, FEDERALISMO Y REGIONALISMO EN BRASIL, 1889-1937, in
FEDERALISMOS LATINOAMERICANOS MEXICO/BRASIIJARGENTINA 181, 209 (Marcello Car-
magnani ed., 1993).
8. CELINA SOUZA, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN BRAZIL: THE POLITICS OF
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 28 (1997).
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D. The Military Regimes (1964-1985)
A military coup d'itat in 1964 produced another cycle of strong
centralization of the powers of the federal government at the ex-
pense of the states and municipalities. This was accomplished in
large part by concentrating the bulk of the taxing power in the
federal government. 9 Unlike the Vargas era, the military permit-
ted the Congress, the Judiciary, and state and local governments
to function, albeit with certain restrictions. Presidential elections
were held, but the franchise was restricted to generals. Congress
was purged of so-called "subversive elements." State governors
were also appointed by the military, and federal intervention into
the states increased significantly. After 1974, as Brazil's economic
growth began to stagnate and the tolerated political opposition
party began to garner more votes than the government's party in
the large urban areas, the military began a process of decentrali-
zation in order to try to hold on to power politically. Elections for
governor were once again permitted, and substantial resources
were allocated to the states and municipalities in an effort to im-
prove the government's chances at the polls and to redress re-
gional inequalities. The military created so-called "bionic" sena-
tors by giving each state a third senator, elected by the state as-
semblies, to try to ensure the government party a majority in the
Senate. The military also created two new pro-government states,
Mato Grosso do Sul and Rond6nia, in the sparsely populated
North and Center-West, and fused the opposition states of Guana-
bara and Rio de Janeiro into a single state called Rio de Janeiro.
Eventually, after a gradual process of transition, the military
permitted the return of civilian government.
E. The New Republic (1985-)
In 1985, Brazil elected its first civilian president since 1960, al-
beit indirectly through an electoral college selected under a set of
rules skewed to favor the military government. In 1988, a new
Constitution, drafted by a congress that included a group of "bi-
onic" senators, significantly decentralized governmental powers
and reinvigorated federalism.
9. See Luis ROBERTO BARROSO, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRO: 0 PROBLEMA
DA FEDERACAO 32-107 (1982).
Summer 2005 581
Duquesne Law Review
III. SOME OF THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF BRAZILIAN
FEDERALISM UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION
A. Allocation of Powers
Every federal system has to resolve the problem of how to divide
legislative powers between the federal government and the subna-
tional units of government. Brazil's 1988 Constitution partly fol-
lows the allocative formula of the U.S. Constitution, but it deline-
ates the distribution of governmental powers in far greater de-
tail.10 The Brazil Constitution contains an usual innovation by
making the Federal District and the municipalities integral mem-
bers of the federation." Brazil also borrows from the German Ba-
sic Law in permitting delegation of exclusive powers and in pro-
viding for joint and concurrent powers. 12 Article 21 of the Consti-
tution specifically delegates to the federal government a broad
array of powers that are meant to be exclusive even though not
specifically denominated as such. These include the powers to
maintain international relations; to declare war and states of siege
and to make peace; to provide for defense; to regulate currency,
exchange rates, and mineral prospecting; and to operate or to
regulate radio and television broadcasting, the post office, and the
federal police. 13 Article 22 grants the federal government another
broad array of powers specifically labelled "exclusive," although
some of these powers overlap or repeat powers delegated in Article
21.14
In twelve areas the federal government, states, federal district,
and municipalities have joint powers; 15 and in sixteen areas the
federal government, states, and the federal district have concur-
10. For a detailed explanation of this formula, see FERNANDO DIAS MENEZES DE
ALMEIDA, COMPETtNCIAS NA CONSTITUICAO DE (1991).
11. BRAz. CONST., art. 18. The Federal District is treated virtually as another state,
electing its own governor and legislature. Moreover, the Federal District is represented in
the federal legislature under the same allocational formula as the states. In contradistinc-
tion to the states, however, the Federal District may not have municipalities. Id., art. 32.
12. German Basic Law, arts. 70-74.
13. BRAZ. CONST. art 21.
14. These include the powers to legislate with respect to civil, commercial, penal, pro-
cedural, electoral, agrarian, maritime, aeronautical, space and labor law; to regulate for-
eign and interstate commerce, ports and navigation, postal service, foreign exchange, ex-
propriation, mining, informatics, national transportation policy, naturalization, social secu-
rity, nuclear activities, and commercial advertising. With respect to Article 22 powers,
Congress may adopt complementary laws (approved by an absolute majority) authorizing
the states to legislate on specific matters in these areas of exclusive federal competence.
BRAZ. CONST. art. 22 (1).
15. BRAZ. CONST. art. 23.
Vol. 43582
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rent legislative authority. 16 In the area of concurrent authority,
the federal government's power is limited to establishing general
rules.17 In the absence of federal legislation, the states may freely
regulate an area; however, the supervenience of a federal law on
general rules suspends the effectiveness of state legislation to the
extent that it contravenes federal law. Whenever the federal gov-
ernment has adopted general rules, the states may adopt only
supplementary legislation. The Constitution assures the political,
legislative, administrative, and financial autonomy to the munici-
palities18 and grants them the power to legislate about subjects of
local interest and to supplement federal and state legislation. 19
The Brazilian Constitution contains a residual clause reserving
to the states the powers not forbidden to them by the Constitu-
tion.20 This clause, which stems from the 10th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, has been included in Brazilian Constitutions
since 1891, even though when the federation was first formed, the
Brazilian provinces never had any powers of their own. The Bra-
zilian Constitution does not grant specifically any exclusive pow-
ers to the states. The powers granted to the federal government
are so extensive, and so much federal legislation has been enacted,
that the states and municipalities are left virtually without any
areas wherein they can legislate free from constraints set by the
federal government. 21 As Fdbio Konder Comparato, one of Brazil's
leading jurists, stated, "[The Union has supreme authority over
other political entities in all economic and financial matters. This
is true to such an extent that the old principle, that powers not
forbidden to States are reserved to them, becomes entirely mean-
ingless."22  Unlike the United States, virtually all important leg-
islation in Brazil, such as the civil code, commercial code (what
little remains in force), criminal code, procedural codes, labor code,
consumer protection code, the corporation law, financial markets
law, and electoral law are all federal statutes that apply uniformly
throughout Brazil.
16. Id. at art. 24.
17. Id. at art. 24 (XVI) § 11.
18. Id. at arts. 18, 29, 30, 31, and 34(VII)c.
19. Id. at art. 30(1) & (I).
20. BRAZ. CONST. art. 25 § 11.
21. AUGUSTO ZIMMERMANN, CuRso DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 345-46 (2002).
22. FAbio Konder Comparato, The Economic Order in the Brazilian Constitution of
1988, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 758 (1990).
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B. Federalism and Judicial Review
The 1988 Constitution significantly strengthened judicial re-
view, creating a plethora of procedural devices by which the Bra-
zilian courts could invalidate statutes and other norms for uncon-
stitutionality. 23 Even though Brazil's highest court, the Supreme
Federal Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal) (hereinafter "the
STF"), decides a large volume of cases, 24 the Brazilian judiciary
really has not served as the ultimate arbiter of the balance of
power between the states and the national government. That bal-
ance has usually been determined by complex political negotia-
tions among the executive, the state governors, and the state's
representatives in the national Congress. 25
This is not to say that the STF does not play an important role
in the preservation of the federal system. Like other federal sys-
tems, the Brazilian Constitution contains a clause mandating the
supremacy of federal law over state and municipal law. 26 The STF
frequently strikes down state and municipal constitutional or
statutory provisions because of conflicts with the federal constitu-
tion, federal law, or invading powers delegated to the federal gov-
ernment.27 It also frequently resolves conflicts involving state
governors and their legislatures. 28 What one does not find in Bra-
23. Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Recent Developments under the 1988
Constitution, 7 Sw. U.J.L. & TRADE AM. 291 (2000); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Consti-
tution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L. 773, 794-98 (1990).
24. According to statistics published on its website, the STF decided a total of 107,867
cases in 2003 and 101,690 cases in 2004.
25. David J. Samuels & Scott Mainwaring, Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Fed-
eral Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil, in FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA 85-125 (Edward L. Gibson ed. 2004). See also Jos6 Antonio Cheibub, Arge-
lina Figueiredo & Fernando Limongi, "Presidential Agenda Power and Decision-Making in
Presidential Regimes: Governors and Political Parties in the Brazilian Congress," Paper
delivered at Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc. Annual Meeting, Boston, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 2002.
26. BRAz. CONST. art. 24 § 41.
27. See, e.g., ADI 1472 (D.J. Oct. 25, 2002); ADI 1918 (D.J. Aug. 1, 2003); ADI 2101
(D.J. Oct. 5, 2001); Al 2487 (D.J. Aug. 5, 2004); ADI 2024 (D.J. Dec. 1, 2000). In Represen-
tagdo No. 1.153-RS, Decision of May 16, 1985, 115 R.T.J. 1008 (Mar. 1986) (striking down a
state law regulating toxic chemicals for agricultural use for federal preemption) the Tribu-
nal quoted with approval the following two sentences from Professor Gonoalves Ferreira's
treatise, COMENT RIOS A CONSTITUIQAO BRASILEIRA 92 (3d ed. 1982):
[Tihe States are prohibited from taking any measure that prevents, makes diffi-
cult, or harms interstate commerce, whatever the means used and regardless of
the motives. According to the Constitution, Brazil is one single market, governed
exclusively by federal legislation.
115 R.T.J. at 1037.
28. Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil. Nominal and Real, 3 GLOBAL JURIST
ADVANCES 1, 15 (No. 1, art. 4, 2003).
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zil, in contradistinction to the United States, is case law invalidat-
ing federal legislation for invading powers reserved to the states.
Nor does one find in STF decisions debate about whether cases
should be governed by state or federal law. This is because Brazil-
ian Constitutions have granted far greater powers to the federal
government than the U.S. Constitution. In addition, Brazil has no
analogue to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
nor has it had a group of Supreme Court judges who have as-
sumed the role of protecting state's rights from infringement by
the federal legislation.
On the other hand, the principle of reciprocal intergovernmental
tax immunity is explicitly set out in the Brazilian Constitution.
Not only does the Constitution prohibit the federal government,
states and municipalities from taxing each others' patrimony, in-
come, and services, 29 but it also prohibits the federal government
from taxing state bonds or creating exemptions from state and
local taxes. 30 In 1993, the STF declared a constitutional amend-
ment permitting the federal government to impose a tax on finan-
cial transactions unconstitutional because the amendment ex-
empted this tax from the general constitutional constraint on the
federal government taxing state and local instrumentalities. The
STF held that this constitutional amendment violated Art. 60 Sec-
tion 4(I), which prohibits any constitutional amendment aimed at
abolishing "the federalist form of the State. '31
C. Federal Court Jurisdiction
The approach to federal jurisdiction is quite different in Brazil
than in the United States and Mexico. In the United States, the
ultimate arbiters of the meaning of state law are the state
29. BRAz. CONST. art. 150 (VI)(a).
30. Id. at Art. 151 (11) and (III).
31. A$Zo Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No. 939 (Relator Min. Sydney Sanches, Dec.
15, 1993), 198 REV. DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 123 (Oct.-Dec. 1994); Agravo de Instrumento
No. 182.536 (Relator Mauricio Corr6a, Apr. 29, 1966), 205 REV. DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO
238 (July.Sept. 1996). In Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113 (1871), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that our dual sovereignty concept of federalism prohibited the federal government from
taxing the salaries of state judges, a doctrine ultimately extended to any state instrumen-
tality. The doctrine of dual sovereignty was repudiated after 1937, and the line of cases
requiring state immunity from federal taxation was ultimately overruled in Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
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courts, 32 while in Mexico, via amparo review, the federal courts
become the ultimate arbiters of the meaning of state law.33
In Brazil, the final arbiter of the meaning of state law can be ei-
ther a state or federal tribunal, depending upon the parties or the
type of case. Both state and federal courts have concurrent juris-
diction over claims based upon either federal or state law. The
basic codes are federal, but whether litigants bring a case in state
or federal courts usually does not depend upon the law involved.
Rather, it depends upon whether the federal government has an
interest in the litigation, and whether there is a federal judge in
the judicial district. If the federal government or one of its agen-
cies has an interest in the outcome, the case is normally brought
in the federal courts.34 If no federal judge exists in the district,
such cases will be tried before a state judge,3 5 and an appeal can
then be taken to the appropriate Federal Regional Tribunal.
Other cases are normally brought in the state courts, and an ap-
peal can be taken to the State Tribunal of Justice. . If the decision
contravenes a treaty or federal law, upholds a state or municipal
law challenged as contrary to federal law, or interprets federal law
differently from some other tribunal, the decision can be reviewed
on special appeal by the second highest federal court, the Superior
Tribunal of Justice. If the decision conflicts with a provision of the
federal Constitution, declares a treaty or federal law unconstitu-
tional, or upholds the constitutionality of a state or local act, an
extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal may be
taken.36
D. Malapportionment
A basic characteristic of federalism is that the states or prov-
inces have entrenched representation within the national govern-
ment. 37 Federal states are almost invariably bicameral. Repre-
sentation in the lower house is usually apportioned on the basis of
population. Many federal systems guarantee each state or prov-
32. Murdock v. The City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874).
33. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
130-31 (1975).
34. Reflecting the far greater centralization of federal jurisdiction in Brazil, every ac-
tion to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, every request for a letter rogatory, and
every extradition fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal
Tribunal. BRAZ. CONST., art. 102 (I)(g) and (h).
35. Id. at art. 109.
36. Id. at arts. 102-08.
37. PRESTON KING, FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 142-43 (1982).
Vol. 43586
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ince equal representation in the upper house, thereby almost in-
variably producing a certain amount of malapportionment. Brazil
goes one step further by allowing every state, regardless of popu-
lation, and Federal District to elect three senators to the national
Congress. 38
This constitutional rule, coupled with a history of eliminating
old states and creating new states for partisan advantage, has
given Brazil one of the most malapportioned upper chambers in
the world. 39  After the military government created two new
sparsely pro-government states and eliminated the populous anti-
government state of Guanabara, the Constituent Assembly, which
was actually the Congress elected under a system of electoral
rules badly skewed by the military, voted to admit three sparsely
populated new states, Tocantins, Roraima, and AmapA, bringing
the total number of states in the federation to twenty-six. The
disparities in population among Brazilian states is shocking. Ac-
cording to 2000 census data, the new state of Roraima has only
325,000 inhabitants, while Sdo Paulo, Brazil's most populous
state, has 37.5 million inhabitants. This means Sdo Paulo has 116
times as many inhabitants as Roraima, yet each state has three
senators. Hence, each senator from the state of Sdo Paulo repre-
sents approximately 12.5 million inhabitants, while each senator
from Roraima represents only about 108,300 inhabitants. A pecu-
liar set of constitutional rules also renders Brazil's lower house,
the Chamber of Deputies, badly malapportioned. While the num-
ber of deputies is theoretically apportioned on the basis of each
state's population, each of the 26 states is entitled to elect a mini-
mum of eight deputies, and each of the three territories is entitled
to elect a minimum of four deputies. Yet no state, regardless of
population, can have more than 70 deputies. 40 As a result, Sdo
Paulo, which on a one-person-one-vote system should have 114
times as many deputies as small states like Roraima, Acre, and
AmapA, has only 8.75 times as many.41 Thus, the poorer, less
densely populated states of the North, Northeast, and Center-
38. BRAZ. CONST. art. 46 § 1.
39. See Alfred Stepan, Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multination-
alism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA 29, 56 (Edward L. Gibson ed. 2004); Alfred Stepan, Brazil's Decentralized
Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?, in "Brazil: The Burden of the
Past; The Promise of the Future" (DAEDALUS), 129 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 145, 149
(Spring 2000).
40. BRAZ. CONST. art. 45 § 1.
41. See Alfred Stepan, supra note 39, 129 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. at 150.
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West are seriously over-represented in the Congress, while the
more populous states of the South and Center regions are badly
underrepresented. As Stepan points out, the result of this malap-
portionment is that states representing only 13 percent of the to-
tal electorate have 51 percent of the votes in the Senate,42 giving
them an effective veto over the majority, as well as large bargain-
ing chip to extract greater transfers of resources from the federal
government.
IV. FISCAL FEDERALISM
Federalist systems have constant debates about the proper allo-
cation of fiscal resources between the federal government and
subnational units. No one is ever satisfied with the existing
scheme, and political forces are continually being marshaled to
promote greater centralization or greater decentralization. 43 The
most difficult challenge confronting any federal system is to
achieve and to maintain the appropriate balance between the re-
sources and responsibilities of the central government and the
resources and responsibilities of the constituent state and local
governments.
As part of its transition to democracy, Brazil instituted impor-
tant constitutional reforms aimed at transferring power and re-
sources from the national government to the states and munici-
palities. These reforms were a reaction to the excessive centrali-
zation of the military regimes and were in large part motivated by
a desire to strengthen democratic institutions by dispersing politi-
cal power more widely and by increasing popular access to democ-
ratic decision-making. They were also motivated by a belief that
local application and disbursement of governmental resources
would lead to greater economic efficiency than centralized control.
This belief turned out to be greatly mistaken. What the Constitu-
ent Assembly drafted was a Constitution that produced economic
42. Alfred Stepan, supra note 39, in FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA at
58.
43. The debate over the "centralized-decentralized" nature of Canadian federalism has
been unending. "Many have likened it to a national sport, suggesting that whatever solu-
tion is found to this conflict will not be the final solution because a substantial component
of the Canadian population will never support it."' Gregory S. Mahler, Canada: Two Na-
tions, One State?, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 56, 67 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds. 1994).
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chaos. In the opinion of the first four presidents operating under
it, the new Constitution had made Brazil ungovernable. 44
A. Restructuring of the Tax System
The 1988 Constitution restructured allocation of tax revenues
from the federal government to the states and municipalities. It
did this partly by transferring certain taxes previously levied by
the federal government to the taxing jurisdiction of the states and
municipalities. It also did this by substantially increasing the ob-
ligation of the federal government to share tax revenues with sub-
national units. Unfortunately for Brazil, in effectuating this real-
location, the Constituent Assembly acted without any rational
plan.45 Instead of mandating a corresponding reallocation of the
federal government's expenditure responsibilities to the subna-
tional units, the Constitution actually increased the expenditure
burden of the federal government. Because of the extremely gen-
erous transfer payments mandated in the 1988 Constitution, the
federal government controlled only 36.5 percent of the tax reve-
nues and bore 43.4 percent of the expenditure burden; the states
received 40.7 percent of the total revenues and had 43 percent of
the expenditure burden. The municipalities received 22.8 percent
of total revenues, but had an expenditure burden of only 13.6 per-
cent.
46
This fiscal imbalance was one of the principal causes of the huge
federal deficit, which fueled extremely high levels of inflation.
Brazil's annual inflation rate, which was 993% in the year the
Constitution was enacted, nearly doubled in 1989 to 1,862%. De-
spite a series of unsuccessful stabilization plans, by 1993 the infla-
tion rate had shot up to 2,489%. During this period, which has
been dubbed an era of "predatory federalism," economic growth
stagnated.
There are other serious problems with the tax structure adopted
by the 1988 Constitution. For example, the principal source of
state revenues is the Tax on the Circulation of Goods (hereinafter
"ICMS"), a cumulative form of value added tax. Instead of being
44. Ernani de Paiva Sim6es, A DiscriminaVdo de Rendas na Constituicdo Federal de
1988 e a Busca de um Novo Modelo Federativo num Mundo Marcado pela Globalizagdo dos
Mercados, in ESTUDOS TRIBUTARIOS (Condorcet Rezende ed., 1999).
45. Flvio Bauer Novelli, Notes on the Brazilian Tax System, in A PANORAMA OF
BRAZILIAN LAW 53, 60 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds., 1992).
46. Anwar Shah, The New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil 18 (World Bank Discussion
Paper No. 124, 1991).
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levied by the state where the good or service is consumed, the
ICMS is levied by the state of production. This flaw has produced
competition among the states to attract investment from other
states by selectively reducing the tax rates, and has the unfortu-
nate effect of failing to exempt exports of goods and services,
thereby making Brazil less competitive in world markets.
By substantially increasing the share of tax revenues that had
to be transferred from the federal government to the states, and
from the states to the municipalities, the 1988 Constitution un-
dermined one of the political advantages of federalism -- local con-
trol. The federal government and/or the states had the political
responsibility for levying and collecting the taxes, but the munici-
palities had only the responsibility for spending much of what
were essentially free funds. This meant that there was little or no
local citizen supervision over the way the municipalities spent tax
monies, for the municipalities were not subjected to the political
pressures of enacting and collecting taxes.
Even worse, Brazil had embedded the entire tax structure and
allocational scheme in the Constitution. While the federal gov-
ernment could tap new sources of revenue by instituting "contri-
butions," the states and municipalities were locked into the reve-
nue sources established in the Constitution. This meant that any
attempt to change the tax system or allocation of revenues re-
quired amending the Constitution. Achieving agreement from the
necessary constituencies on improving the tax structure has
proven exceedingly difficult. 47
B. State Indebtedness
Federalism contributed to Brazil's economic problems in other
significant ways. Historically, Brazilian states have spent more
than they receive, financing their debts with foreign and domestic
borrowing. When the states were unable to pay those debts dur-
ing the early 1980s, the federal government agreed to assume the
states' foreign debts in exchange for the states' promise to repay
the federal government. Since then, this process has been re-
peated several times, with the federal government each time
granting generous repayment terms. Much of uncontrolled state
47. See Victor Duarte Lledo, "Tax Reform under Fiscal Stress: A CGE Analysis of the
Brazilian Tax Reform" (May 31, 2001); Marcus Andrd Melo, When Institutions Matter: A
Comparison of the Politics of Administrative, Social Security, and Tax Reforms in Brazil, in
REINVENTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 211, 226-239 (Ben Ross Schneider & Blanca Heredia eds. 2003).
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spending went towards increased personnel costs, which increased
by 77% between 1985 and 1990 as a percentage of the Gross Do-
mestic Product. The cost of servicing the states' huge debt, which
by 1997 totaled $139 billion in U.S. currency, helped fuel the infla-
tionary process. 48
C. State Banks
Still another aspect of federalism that contributed to the federal
government's inability to control inflation was the allowance of
state ownership of commercial banks without the adoption of poli-
cies and controls needed to insure that these banks would operate
in accordance with fiscally sound bank practice. Practically all of
the Brazilian states and the Federal District owned commercial
banks, which were primarily operated to serve the governors' po-
litical agendas rather than in accordance with sound financial
principles. These banks operated with little effective supervision
from the federal government. They racked up huge debts to fi-
nance the pet projects of governors and state enterprises. 49 These
debts, which totaled $96 billion in U.S. currency by 1998, were
covered by state issued bonds or by the Central Bank. In essence,
these profligate state banks were themselves part of the inflation
problem because their operations effectively increased the money
supply by their uncontrolled creation of credit. Until 1995, the
federal government routinely bailed out the essentially bankrupt
state banks because of a need to curry favor with state governors.
D. Restoration of Fiscal Sanity
In 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Finance Minister
and soon to become Brazil's President for the next eight years,
began changing the institutional rules on fiscal federalism to bring
some semblance of order to the economic chaos. In many federal
systems, constitutional amendments require approval of the sub-
national units, but this is not the case in Brazil. The Brazilian
Constitution can be amended by three-fifths majorities in both
houses of the Congress in two rounds of voting, a process that is
usually doable, albeit costly in terms of pork barrel payoffs. 50
48. David J. Samuels & Scott Mainwaring, supra note 25, at 105.
49. Harry M. Makler, Bank Transformation and Privatization in Brazil: Financial
Federalism and Some Lessons about Bank Privatization, 40 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 45-69
(2000).
50. The Brazilian Constitution has been amended 51 times since March 1992.
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Amendments may be proposed by a majority of the state legisla-
tures, but, fortunately, their consent is not required to approve an
amendment.51
1. The Plano Real
In 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso came up with the Plano
Real, a stabilization plan that actually worked. One of the rea-
sons for the Plano Real's success was that it was accompanied by a
constitutional amendment that changed the revenue sharing rules
in the 1988 Constitution for fiscal years 1994 -1995.52 The
amendment created an Emergency Social Fund that transferred
an estimated nine billion dollars from state and local governments
to the federal government. Because of strong political resistance
from the states and municipalities, as well as a Congress with an
insatiable appetite for pork, the federal government was never
able to make the Emergency Social Fund a permanent part of the
Constitution. Instead, successive constitutional amendments have
extended the life of the Fund through the end of 1999. 53 In 2000,
another constitutional amendment replaced the Fund with a tran-
sitory provision permitting the federal government to exercise
complete fiscal autonomy with respect to 20 percent of its budget-
ary resources for the next three years. 54 In 2003, yet another con-
stitutional amendment extended this 20 percent retention until
2007.55
2. Curbs on State Borrowing and Privatization of State
Banks
In 1994, the federal government also began the process of re-
stricting state borrowing. Senate Resolution 11 of January 31,
1994, imposed two rules: (1) a state's total debt service cannot ex-
ceed the lesser of the state's operating surplus during the past
year or 15 percent of the state's revenues, and (2) a state's new
borrowing during any 12-month period cannot exceed the lesser of
the state's present debt service or 17 percent of the state's reve-
51. BRAZ. CONST. art. 60.
52. Amendment of Revision No. 1 of Mar. 1, 1994, which added Art. 71 to the Transi-
tional Constitutional Provisions Act.
53. BRAz. CONST. AMEND. No. 10 of Mar. 4, 1996, extended the Emergency Social Fund
through June 30, 1997; Const. Amendment No. 17 of Nov, 22, 1997 extended the life of the
Fund through Dec. 31, 1999.
54. BRAZ. CONST. AMEND. No. 27 of Mar. 21, 2000.
55. BRAz. CONST. AMEND. No. 42 of Dec. 19, 2003.
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nues. 56 When the federal government refinanced state debts in
1997 and 1998, it required the states to sign contracts agreeing to
adhere to specific targets with respect to their payroll expendi-
tures, privatization and new investments. 57 It also prevented
states from issuing bonds unless their total debt was less than one
year's worth of real net revenues. Similar constraints were im-
posed upon the municipalities as a condition of refinancing their
debts.58 A resolution of the National Monetary Council in 1998
prohibited the states and municipalities from borrowing abroad.
5 9
When Itmar Franco, Governor of the State of Minas Gerais, re-
fused to pay his state's foreign debt, President Cardoso withheld
all federal transfers and seized funds in the state's bank accounts
to pay the debt, an expensive lesson not lost on other governors.
Since 1997, no states have defaulted with respect to debt pay-
ments due to the federal government.
The Cardoso government also succeeded in privatizing most of
the state banks. The process took many years, and it was a costly
one for the federal government, which usually had to refinance the
debts owed by the state to the bank on terms highly favorable to
the state. New constraints on state borrowing were imposed in
2000 by the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, discussed below.
3. Controlling State and Municipal Expenditures
The success of the Plano Real propelled Cardoso into the Brazil-
ian presidency in 1995. By skillful and forceful negotiations, Car-
doso was able to persuade Congress to enact a series of constitu-
tional amendments and laws that substantially improved the fi-
56. Anwar Shah, Fiscal Federalism and Economic Governance: For Better or For Worse?
(Sustainable Development Department, UN Food & Agric. Org., Dec. 1997)
(www.FAO.ORG/SDIROdirect/ROfo0013.htm). Resolution No. 11 was subsequently re-
placed by a more complex system set out in Senate Resolution No. 69 of Dec. 14, 1995.
57. .Provisional Measure No. 1.560 of Jan. 17, 1997, reissued monthly; Law No. 9.496
of 1997. All but two of Brazil's twenty-six states signed agreements with the federal gov-
ernment accepting the terms of this law for debt renegotiation. Ilan Goldfajn & Eduardo
Refinetti Guardia, Regras Fiscais e Sustentabilidade da Divida no Brasil, 39 NOTAS
T]kCNIcAs Do BANCO CENTRAL Do BRASIL 18 (Jy. 2003). See also Jos6 Roberto Afonso, "The
Brazilian Federation: Facts, Challenges and Prospects," (Working Paper No. 149, Aug.
2002, Ctr. For Res. On Econ. Devel. & Pol'y Reform, Stanford Univ.).
58. Municipalities had to agree to utilize 13 percent of their of their real net revenues
for servicing their refinanced debt, to refrain from issuing new domestic or foreign bonds
until after total liquidation of their refinanced debts, and to refrain from contracting new
debts, including those from international financing agencies, until their total debt reached
a level of less than one year's real liquid revenues. Provisional Measure No. 1.811 of Feb.
25, 1999. See also Provisional Measure No. 1.891-5 of June 29, 1999.
59. David J. Samuels & Scott Mainwaring, supra note 25, at 113.
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nancial chaos of Brazil's previous fiscal federalism. 60  Because
some of the states and municipalities had been spending more
than 90 percent of their revenues on personnel, the so-called
Camata Law of 1995 required that as of January 1999, all units of
Brazilian Government had to limit their payroll expenses to 60%
of their disposable revenues. In 1996, Congress enacted a com-
plementary law called the Kandir Law, 61 which exempted ex-
ported goods from the state value added tax (ICMS), thereby in-
creasing the competitiveness of Brazilian exports. The price for
securing state consent was an agreement by the federal govern-
ment to compensate the states for revenue losses.
Constitutional Amendment No. 19 of June 4, 1998, made a
number of important changes to control Brazil's bloated bureauc-
racy. First, it gave the federal government exclusive power to set
general rules for bidding and contracting by all state and munici-
pal entities. Second, it limited the salaries of state representa-
tives to 75% of that paid to federal deputies, and limited salaries
of municipal alderman to 75% of that paid to state representa-
tives.62 Third, it restricted salaries of all civil servants, including
governors, to that paid to a minister of Federal Supreme Tribunal.
Fourth, it eliminated the constitutional prohibition on dismissing
tenured civil servants. Fifth, it prohibited all governmental per-
sonnel expenditures from exceeding limits to be established by a
complementary Budget Law. In February 2000, the Cardoso gov-
ernment secured another constitutional amendment to restrain
spending by the municipalities. This amendment limits the sala-
ries for aldermen in the smaller municipalities to 20 - 60 percent
of the salary of a state representative. It also limits the total ex-
penses of municipal councils to 5 - 8% of total revenues, depending
upon the size of the municipality. No county council may spend
more than 70% of total revenues on salaries. In addition, the
amendment makes it an impeachable offense for any prefect
(mayor) of a municipality to fail to comply with the Budget Law. 63
60. Fortunately, the Brazilian Constitution is far easier to amend than is the U.S.
Constitution. All that is required is votes by Congress with an extraordinary three-fifths
majority. There is no requirement that amendments be submitted to the states or popular
assembles for ratification. BRAZ. CONST., art. 60 (2).
61. Complementary Law No. 47 of 1996.
62. A similar provision was enacted previously as Amendment No. of Mar. 31, 1992,
which also prohibited any municipality from spending more than 5% of its revenues on
compensation of its aldermen.
63. Const. Amendment No. 15 of Feb. 14, 2000.
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Congress also enacted amendments to reduce constitutionally
mandated expenditures at all government levels and to reallocate
expenditure responsibilities of the various federative units in the
area of education and health. For example, a 1996 constitutional
amendment reallocated responsibilities for organizing and financ-
ing education among the federal government, states, and munici-
palities. 64 Another constitutional amendment enacted in 2000
requires the federal government, states, and municipalities to al-
locate fixed percentages of their tax receipts over the next four
years for public health.65 Several amendments have been enacted
to try to put the governmental retirement and social security sys-
tems on a sounder fiscal basis. 66 Other constitutional amend-
ments have been enacted to permit the federal government to im-
pose new taxes to avoid having to resort to inflationary financ-
ing.67 Finally, after a bitter struggle, an amendment enacted in
December 2003 partially reformed Brazil's overly complex tax sys-
tem and improved cooperation among the different taxing authori-
ties.68
4. The Law on Fiscal Responsibility
In May 2000, Congress enacted a complementary law, the Law
of Fiscal Responsibility (hereinafter "LRF"), which imposes a se-
ries of rules on all levels of government to try to insure fiscal re-
sponsibility and transparency in public finance.69 This law repre-
sents a new stage of Brazilian federalism.
The LRF limits the public debt of states to two times current re-
ceipts. For municipalities, the debt limit is set at 1.2 times cur-
rent receipts. If the public debt of the states or municipalities ex-
ceeds those levels, in the next year authorities must take meas-
ures to reduce excess debt by at least one fourth in the following
64. BRAZ. CONST. AMEND. No. 14 of Sept. 12, 1996.
65. BRAz. CONST. AMEND No. 29 of Sept. 13, 2000.
66. BRAZ. CONST. AMEND No. 20 of Dec. 16, 1998; BRAZ. CONST. AMEND No. 41 of Dec.
19, 2003.
67. E.g., BRAZ. CONST. AMEND No. 37 of June 12, 2002, extending for the third time the
federal tax on financial transactions (CPMF); BRAZ. CONST. AMEND No. 33 of Dec. 11, 2001,
creating the Assessment for the Intervention on Economic Domain (CIDE). Brazil's latest
amendment, however, points in the opposite direction, increasing from 25 to 29 percent the
amount that the federal government must turn over to the states and Federal District from
its collection of the CIDE.
68. BRAZ. CONST. AMEND. 42 of Dec. 19, 2003.
69. Complementary Law No. 101 of May 4, 2000.
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four months. 70 The LRF also prohibits one level of the federation
from bailing out another level and the refinancing of loans by an-
ticipating revenue receipts, a much abused public financing
mechanism in Brazil.
The LRF seeks to avoid the common practice of leaving debts for
the next administration. Therefore, the LRF prohibits all levels of
government from contracting new expenditure obligations in the
last year of an administration unless officials can demonstrate
that the expenditure can be fully paid off during the administra-
tion's term or that sufficient cash has been left to fund the obliga-
tion.
The LRF imposes new limits on governmental personnel expen-
ditures. The federal government may spend a maximum of 50
percent of current revenue on personnel. The states and munici-
palities may spend no more than 60 percent of current revenues
on their payrolls. Moreover, each branch of government is subject
to a specific ceiling. The Federal Executive can spend no more
than 37.9 percent, the Federal Legislature no more than 2.5 per-
cent, the Federal Judiciary no more than 6 percent, and the Public
Ministry no more than .6 percent. There are corresponding per-
centages at the state and local levels.
Finally, the LRF imposes transparency obligations. All levels of
government must publish fiscal targets and report publicly on
their debts, receipts, and expenditures. Common accounting
standards were established, and officials are required to publish
not only annual statements of account, but quarterly reports as
well. Failures to comply with the rules set forth in the LRF are
sanctioned with administrative penalties and withholding of fed-
eral transfers. Non-complying officials may also be removed from
office, fined, or even imprisoned.71
V. CONCLUSIONS
Brazilian federalism under the 1988 Constitution has involved
an enormous struggle to try to achieve monetary stability, a sound
currency, and fiscal sanity, as well as to avoid debt default.
Achieving the series of constitutional amendments and legislation
necessary to rein in state and municipal profligacy and to loosen
70. A Senate addition to the Law allowed states with excess public debt in 2002 to
reduce the excess by 1/15 each year for the next 15 years.
71. Criminal sanctions for officials who fail to comply with the LRF are imposed by the
Law of Fiscal Crimes, Law No. 10.028 of Oct. 19, 2000.
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the straightjacket of constitutional transfers and mandated ex-
penditures has been a difficult and costly process for the federal
government. The Brazilian Congress and the state governors
have had a voracious appetite for pork that has had to be supplied
by the federal government to secure the extraordinary majorities
in Congress required to enact constitutional amendments. More-
over, the costs to the federal government of privatizing the state
banks, refinancing the state debts, and compensating lost tax
revenues have also been huge. That the federal government has
never been able to rewrite the constitutional fiscal formula on a
permanent basis, but must renegotiate it every few years, indi-
cates the enormous political power of state and local governments.
This power does not bode well for future federal governments that
may be headed by persons less competent than Fernando Henri-
que Cardoso or those with less political support in Congress.
Starting from the U.S. model, Brazil has evolved its own unique
form of federalism. That federalism is dynamic and vibrant, with
the states and municipalities having real power and resources.
Brazilian federalism is also constantly changing over time, as each
regime struggles to achieve the "right" formula. Unfortunately,
specifically embedding so many specific details in the Constitution
means that Brazil will have to continue to amend the Constitution
as the struggle for fiscal sanity and reduction in the enormous
"Brazil cost" continues. The most sensible solution would be sim-
ply to deconstitutionalize all but the bare bones of the tax system
and many of the specific federalist details. This is exceedingly
unlikely, however, for the principal beneficiaries of the cottage
industry in constitutional amendments are members of Con-
gress. 72 This is simply an additional "Brazil cost" resulting from
the unfortunate decision to entrust the Congress with the task of
drafting the 1988 Constitution, 73 and is not likely to change until
Brazil adopts yet another constitution.
72. Bresser-Pereira, chief architect of the Cardoso regime's major reforms reports that
his initial attempts at deconstitutionalization had to be abandoned as politically nonviable.
Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira, The 1995 Public Management Reform in Brazil: Reflections of
a Reformer, in REINVENTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89, 98-99 (Ben Ross Schneider & Blanca Heredia eds., 2003).
73. That the Congress serve as the constituent assembly appears to have been a condi-
tion secretly imposed by the military high command. JAVIER MARTINEZ-LARA, BUILDING
DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 1985-95, 57 (1996);
David Fleischer, The Constituent Assembly and the Transformation Strategy: Attempts to
Shift Political Power from the Presidency to Congress, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
BRAZIL: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION 210, 221 (Lawrence Graham & Robert
H. Wilson eds. 1990). This was publicly confirmed (although later denied) by Fernando
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The results of the federal government's imposition of fiscal re-
sponsibility upon the subnational units have been impressive. Be-
tween 1998 and 2002, states went from a primary deficit equal to
0.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product to a surplus of 0.7 percent
of Gross Domestic Product. Only three states are still above the
limits fixed by the LRF.7 4 On the other hand, query whether the
Brazilian approach, which essentially strips the subnational units
of a critical aspect of their sovereignty, is consistent with genuine
federalism.
Henrique Cardoso. After his denial, the reporter published the tape of Cardoso's confirma-
tion in the May 21, 1990 issue of the Folha de Sdo Paulo. See Jorge Zaverucha, "The 1988
Constitution and its Authoritarian Legacy: FORMALIZING DEMOCRACY WHILE GUTI'NG ITS
ESSENCE," paper presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association,
Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997, pp. 6-7.
74. Eduardo Refinetti Guardia & Daniel Sonder, "Fiscal Adjustment and Federalism in
Brazil," (Paper presented at IMF/NIPFP Conf. on Fiscal Pol'y in India, New Delhi, Jan. 16-
17, 2004), p. 20.
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